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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application
of
MARLA MORSE for a
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
MARLA MORSE,
Petitioner and Appellant,

No. 8764

vs.
JOE STEED and MARJORIE STEED,
Defendants and Respondents
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT JOE STEED

ADDITIONAL STATMENT OF FACTS
The respondent desires to call to the Court's attention
the following additional facts from those stated in appellant's brief.
The infant daughter of the unwed mother, Marla Morse,
was voluntarily surrendered to the defendants, Joseph W.
Steed and Marjorie Steed, his wife, with a written consent
to adoption, a copy of which consent is marked exhibit
"A" and attached to defendant Joe Steed's answer. The
defendants, after receiving custody of the child and the
written consent of the mother, paid the hospital charges
of the mother in connection with her confinement and the
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

birth of the child and obligated themselves to pay the expenses of the doctor in connection with the confinement.
They have cared for the child continuously since custody
was given to them by the mother on September 9, 1957.
The child has continuously been at the home of the defendants, in Idaho, during this period of time and the defendants have developed a strong, loving, attachment and
affection for said child. The mother, Marla Morse, has at
no time since the child was placed in the custody of the defendants by he·r, visited the home of the defendants or made
any inquiry whatsoever as to the child's welfare or wellbein·g.
The defendants on the 20th day of September, 1957,
filed their petition for the adoption of said child in the Probate Court of Oneida County, Idaho. The petitioner and
appellant, Marla Morse, is represented by counsel in connection with the adoption proceedings in the State of Idaho,
which is being continued pending determination of this
appeal.
The defendant, Marjorie Steed, has never been served
with process in this action and the Utah Court does not
have jurisdiction over her. The said Marjorie Steed has
custody of the child and would be the one with power to
produce the absent child in the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE CHILD WHOSE CUSTODY IS
SOUGHT IS NOT A DOMICILIARY OF THE STATE OF

UTAH.
POINT II. THE CHILD IS DOMICILED IN THE
STATE OF IDAHO BEING AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
AND HAVING BEEN ABANDONED, DESERTED AND
SURRENDERED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER UNDER
A WRITTEN CONSENT AND RELEASE TO THE DEFENDANTS.
2
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POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT OF WElBER
COUNTY, UTAH, IN A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS, HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
THE INFANT IN THE STATE OF IDAHO.
POINT IV. NO SERVICE OF PROCESS HAS BEEN
HAD UPON THE DEFENDANT, MARJORIE STEED, IN
THE STATE OF U1:AH, AND THE UTAH COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER HER. THE DEFENDANT,
MARJORIE STEED, IS THE ONE HAVING PRIMARY
CONTROL OVER THE CHILD AND ONE WHO THE
COURT COULD EXPECT TO PRODUCE THE CHILD.
POINT IV. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FILED A
PETITION FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD IN
IDAHO WHICH IS THE PROPER COURT AND PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE THE CUSTODY OF THE
CIDLD.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CHILD WHOSE CUSTODY IS
SOUGHT IS NOT A DOMICILIARY OF THE STATE OF
UTAH.
POINT II. THE CHILD IS DOMIGILED IN THE
STATE OF IDAHO BEING AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
AND HA;VING BEEN ABANDONED, DESERTED AND
SURRENDERED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER UNDER
A WRI'ITEN CONSENT AND RELEASE TO THE DEFENDANTS.

The child in question is the illegitimate child of the petitioner and appellant, Marla Morse. Said Marla Morse,
following the birth of said child abandoned, deserted and
surrendered the child to the defendants Joseph S. Steed
and Marjorie Steed, his wife, to be taken by them to their
home in Stone, Idaho. This written consent was given by
said Marla Morse freely and voluntarily before a notary
public. See the copy of the consent attached to the answer
3
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of defendant Joe Steed in the file. See Also 17A Am Jur.
250. See. 71.
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER
COUNTY, UTAH, IN A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING
HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
INFANT IN THE STATE OF IDAHO.
The general rule is stated in 25 Am. Jur. 222 Sec. 106,
as follows:
"It may be laid down as a general rule that a
court has no authority to issue a writ of habeas
corpus directed to a person outside of its territorial jurisdiction since it is a cardinal principal of
law that no sovereignty can by its judgments or
decrees directly bind or affect property or persons
beyond the limit of that sovereignty. Generally
speaking neither a state nor a federal court has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus directed to persons outside the territorial limits of the
district in and for which the court was established .... "
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with habeas
corpus appear to presuppose that the person wrongfully
restrained is within the state, or in other words, within the
jurisdiction of the court. See Rule 65B (f) (5) which reads:
"If the defendant conceals himself or refuses admittance to the person attempting to serve the writ
or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state
after service of the writ, the person serving the
writ shall immediately arrest the defendant or
other persons so retraining and bring him together with the person designated in the writ forthwith
before the court before which the writ is returnable."
See also Rule 65B (f) (6) which reads:
"At the time of the issuance of the writ the court
.may if it appears that the person designated will
be carried out of the jurisdiction of the court or
will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the writ can be enforced, cause a wan·ant
to issue reciting the facts and directing the sheriff
4
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to take such person and forthwith bring him before the court to be dealt with according to law."
Appellant's brief refers to the collection of cases in 9
ALR 2d etseq. In this annotation we read on page 439,
Sec. 3.
"The judicial solution of problems regarding the
custody of children, or for that matter of domestic
relations generally has never been wholly satisfactory either from a social or legal viewpoint,
especially when multistate elements complicate the
situation. There is little accord among the
authorities as to the proper basis of jurisdiction to
award custody of a minor ch~, and the cases dealing with this question are in considerable confusion."
This same annotation discusses three theories as the basis
for jurisdiction over the subject matter of a child custody
proceeding. The one theory which has been adopted by
the Restatement is simply one of status and as such subject
to the Control of the courts of the state where the child is
domiciled. The second theory treats the problem as one
of determining the conflicting rights of the parents to the
custody of their child and has held that in personam jurisdiction over the parents is sufficient, irrespective of the
domicile or whereabouts of the child. This annotation states
the third theory as follows: "A third theory considers that
the fact that a child is physically present within the state
is sufficient to give the courts of the state jurisdiction to
award custody of the child on the ground that the basic problem before the court is to determine what the best interests
of the child are and the court best qualified to do so is the
one having access to the child. This view has been well
expressed by Judge Cardozo, when he stated:
"The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody
of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its
origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless . . . . For this the residence of a
5
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child suffices though the domicile be elsewhere."
See 9 ALR 2d 440.
In all of the cases cited in appellant's brief it is noted
that the action grew out of a divorce proceeding. The
cases deal generally with one ·state giving full faith and
credit to an order or decree of another state or an instance
where the court has jurisdiction of the parties to the divorce proceedings and exercises its power to make a custody award of the children. In the case at bar there is no
connection whatsoever with a divorce proceeding nor a
question concerning the power of a court in a divorce proceeding with jurisdiction over the husband and wife, to
make its order or decree determining custody of their children in another state.
There are numerous cases holding that the courts of
one state have no legal control over, or interest in, the
children of another state, and can make no order through
its courts with respect thereto except to adjudicate the
equitable personal rights of the parents themselves if both
be before the court. See the annotation in 4 ALR 2d 25,
also Peyton v. Peyton 29 NM 618, 225 P 576; Re Hubbard
82 NY 90; State ex rei. Clark v. Clark, 4 So. 2d 517, 148
Fla 452.
In this same annotation, 4 ALR 2d, at page 26, Sec. 11,
we read:
"Even though the court has juris diction over the
parents or persons with power to bring the nonresident child within the state, still the court has
been held to lack power to make a custody award."
Numerous cases are cited therein in support of this rule.
In particular see Re Chandler (1940) 36 Cal. App. 2d 583,
97 P2d 1048; also Giachetti vs. Giachetti (1946) 157 Fla.
259, 25 So. 2d 658; also Ritchison v. Ritchison (1945) 28
Tenn. App. 432, 191 SW 2d 188; and Lake v. Lake (1947)
-Wyo-, 182 P2d 824.
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POINT IV. NO SERVICE OF PROCESS HAS BEEN
HAD UPON THE DEFENDANT, MARJORIE STEED, IN
THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THE UTAH COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER HER. THE DEFENDANT,
MARJORIE STEED, IS THE ONE HAVING PRIMARY
CONTROL OVER THE CHILD AND ONE WHO THE
COURT COULD EXPECT TO PRODUCE THE CHILD.
As is apparent from the file in this case, the defendant, Marjorie Steed, was never served with process in the
habeas corpus proceedings in the State of Utah and the
Utah Court had no jurisdiction over her. Consequently
she is not a party to this appeal. Yet she is the person
who has cared for and mothered the infant since it was
abandoned to her by the petitioner and appellant, Marla
Morse.
Marjorie Steed and not Joe Steed is the one having
primary control over the child and the one who the court
could expect to produce the child.
POINT V. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FILED A
PETITION FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CillLD IN
IDAHO, WHICH IS THE PROPER COURT AND PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE THE CUSTODY OF THE
CHILD.
The defendants, Joe Steed and Marjorie Steed, on September 20, 1957, filed in the Probate Court of Oneida County, State of Idaho, a petition for the adoption of the child.
The petitioner, Marla Morse, is a party to that proceedings
in Idaho and represented by counsel. That court would
seem to be the proper court to determine the custody of the
child, it clearly having jurisdiction of both of the defendants as well as the child. See opinion of J. Cardozo in
Finlay v. Finlay N.Y. (1925) 240 N.Y. 429, 148 NE 624
wherein the court held:
"The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody
7
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of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its
origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless. (Several cases cited) For this
the residence of the child suffices, though the
domicile be elsewhere . . . . "
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court did
not have jurisdiction in the habeas corpus proceedings and
that it's judgment dismissing the same should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
0. DEE LUND.
Attorney for Respondent
Joe Steed
31 First Security Bank Bldg.,
Brigham City, Utah.
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